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Power grids exhibit patterns of reaction to outages similar to complex networks.
Blackout sequences follow power laws, as complex systems operating near a critical
point. Here, the tolerance of electric power grids to both accidental and malicious
outages is analyzed in the framework of complex network theory. In particular, the
quantity known as efficiency is modified by introducing a new concept of distance
between nodes. As a result, a new parameter called net-ability is proposed to evaluate
the performance of power grids. A comparison between efficiency and net-ability is
provided by estimating the vulnerability of sample networks, in terms of both the
metrics.
PACS: 89.75.Hc, 89.75.Fb, 84.70.+p
Technological infrastructures are of vital importance for contemporary soci-
eties. As a consequence of the world wide growing interconnections, the security
of networks such as world-wide-web, transport, power systems, is becoming a
priority in the agenda of policy-makers, industrial and academic researchers. In
recent years several blackouts occurring in USA and Europe have drawn a lot of
attention to security problems in electric power transmission systems. In these
scenarios, it is convenient to go beyond the traditional deterministic bottom-up
description in favor of a statistical top-down approach. Also the specific area of
power systems has attracted the physicists community interested in the appli-
cations of complex network theory. In this paper, we investigate the topological
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2structure and resilience of power grids by adopting a complex network descrip-
tion. We notice that the geodesic distance, used in complex network metrics,
can be generalized to account for the flow capacity between nodes. Based on this
new concept of distance, a metric called net-ability is introduced to estimate the
performance and resilience of power networks upon line removal.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern states and societies can only function if the necessary infrastructures are contin-
uously available and fully operative. Critical infrastructures are organizations or facilities
of key importance to public interest whose failure or impairment could result in detrimental
supply shortages, substantial disturbance to public order or economic impact. The theory
of complex networks is increasingly being exploited to tackle those sorts of issues. For a
comprehensive review on complex networks we refer to [1]. Examples of applications include
facilities for electricity generation, transmission and distribution, oil and gas production,
telecommunication, water supply, agriculture (food production and distribution), public
health (hospital, ambulances), transportation systems (fuel supply, railways, airports, har-
bors), financial and security services [2]-[20]. Due to their importance, a crucial issue is
learning how to improve the tolerance of critical infrastructure to failures and attacks. A
line of research investigating issues of flow and transportation in complex networks is under
active development [21]-[30]. A major threat for the proper functioning of power networks
is that of large blackouts that may involve big cities or even portions of states. Traditionally
such occurrences were caused by accidental faults and thus were quite rare; however, in
recent years power systems, as well as other critical infrastructures, have become a potential
target for intentional attacks. The main difference is that malicious attacks may not be
random but rather directed specifically to the most sensitive parts of the system, in terms
of the impact they can cause. Thus, most of the applications of complex network concepts
to power systems are aimed at understanding the behavior of power grids both in case of
accidental failures and of malicious attacks [31]-[44].
The tolerance of a network to failures is normally intended as the ability of the network
to maintain its connectivity properties after the deletion of a fraction of its nodes or lines.
In this way the problem can be mapped into a standard percolation problem, of the type
3extensively studied in statistical physics [45], [46]. However, a pure connectivity approach,
which may be suitable for instance in the case of the World Wide Web, does not seem to
catch most of the crucial features of a power network. In general a power network can
indeed undergo severe damages even without any inverse percolation taking place; on the
contrary, it can happen that some less important nodes become isolated, thus changing the
connectivity of the network, without strongly affecting its global performance.
A parameter introduced to evaluate the tolerance of complex networks to outages is the
efficiency [47]. In the present paper we further develop this concept and propose a new
parameter to evaluate the performance of a power grid, which we name net-ability. The new
definition takes into account some peculiar features of electrical networks such as the flow
limits and the power flow allocation through the network, due to the inherent physical laws.
The paper is structured as follows: in Section II we review the definition of efficiency
pointing out its meaning in relation to power grids. In Section III we introduce the definition
of net-ability. In Section IV we provide examples of the application of net-ability to evaluate
the static tolerance to outages of a few sample networks. Comparison between efficiency and
net-ability is finally provided. General conclusions and comments are provided in Section
V. Finally, in the Appendix we recall some basic notions about power systems analysis used
in the paper.
II. EFFICIENCY AND VULNERABILITY
As a preliminary step, let us briefly recall the definition of geodesic distance commonly
used in the literature on complex networks. Let us start considering an un-weighted graph:
the number of lines in a path connecting nodes i and j is called the length of the path. A
geodesic path (or shortest path) between i and j is the path connecting these nodes with
minimum length. The length of the geodesic path is the geodesic distance dij between i and
j. If one is dealing with a weighted graph, the length of a path is the sum of the weights of
the lines constituting that path.
The global efficiency E of a network was first introduced by Latora and Marchiori [47]
as follows:
E =
1
N(N − 1)
∑
i 6=j
1
dij
, (1)
where N is the number of nodes of the network and dij is the geodesic distance between the
4nodes i and j ; the sum is taken over all pairs of nodes of the network. The global efficiency
is a measure of the performance of the network, under the assumption that the efficiency
for sending information between two nodes i and j is proportional to the reciprocal of their
distance.
In many networks it happens that some nodes and lines are more important than others.
While naively one would say that the most important nodes are those with the highest
degree [48], for large networks it is often non trivial to find out which are the components
that actually are most critical for the performance of the network. Since the efficiency
has been associated with the performance of the network, a natural way to find critical
components of a network is by looking for the nodes or lines whose removal causes the
biggest drops in efficiency. The vulnerability VE(l) of a line l can be defined as the drop in
the performance when the line l is removed from the network [49]:
VE(l) =
E − El
E
, (2)
where E is the global efficiency of the network and El is the global efficiency after the removal
of the line l. When a node is removed, all the lines attached to the node are removed as
well.
A definition of network vulnerability is the maximum vulnerability of all its nodes [50]:
V = max
l
V (l) . (3)
The general definition of vulnerability, Eq. (2) as a drop in the efficiency can be usefully
applied also to power networks. However, when applied to power grids, some problems arise
with the definition of efficiency given by Eq. (1).
Specifically, the efficiency defined by Eq. (1) shows three main problems when applied to
power grids.
1. In electrical circuits power does not flow from a node i to another node j along a single
specific path (for instance the geodesic path), but rather along all the paths connecting
i to j according to the power flow; see the Appendix for a simplified method to solve
the power flow equations. Therefore the classical idea of geodesic distance is not suited
for power grids and a different concept of distance needs to be introduced.
2. In the Eq. (1) the sum is taken over all pair of nodes. However in electrical circuits
5power flows only from generation to load nodes, so only distances between generator-
load pairs should be taken into account.
3. For each pair (i, j) of generation and load nodes, the network has a different transfer
capability Cij in transmitting power. Suppose we increase the power injection at node
i until the first line reaches its line flow limit: Cij is equal to the power injection in
that moment.
III. FROM EFFICIENCY TO NET-ABILITY
In the same spirit of the efficiency described in the previous section, the net-ability of a
power transmission grid is defined as a measure of its performance under normal operating
conditions. The function of a power transmission network is to transmit a time dependent
amount of power from generation nodes to load nodes in the most convenient technical and
economic way. The economic issues are related to transmission costs and economic efficiency
(social surplus) of the underlying market, while the technical issues refer to losses, voltage
drop and stability. The actual ability of a power transmission grid to perform properly
depends on its topological structure and on the impedance and flow limits of its lines.
The concept of distance dij may be explained as the difficulty to transfer the relevant
quantity between the nodes (i, j) of a network. Distance in general depends on the path
that one follows and thus should be defined as a function of the characteristics of the lines
along the path. The economic and technical difficulties for transmission of electrical power
through a path depend on both the power flow through the lines and on their impedance:
with the same impedance, higher power flow increases costs; with the same power flow,
higher impedance increases costs. Consequently, the distance from node i to node j along
path k is related not only to the impedance of each line of the path but also to the power
flows through the lines of the path. As a result, we define the electrical distance as:
dkij =
∑
l∈k
f lkZl , (4)
where f lk is the power transmission distribution factor of line l in path k and Zl its impedance
(see Eq. (A9) in the Appendix for details) .
On account of the Eq. (4), we propose the following definition for the net-ability of a
6power transmission grid:
A =
1
NGND
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈D
Cij
∑
k∈Hij
pkij
1
dkij
(5)
where G and D are the sets of generator and load nodes respectively, while Hij is the set of
paths from generator i to load j; likewise NG and ND are the total numbers of generators
and loads respectively. Finally, pkij is the power share of path k in transmitting power from
i to j.
Let us stress that the definition of distance given in the Eq. (4) is referred to a specific
path. There is not the concept of geodesic distance or shortest path here, in principle all
the paths are to be taken into account separately.
Let us call Zij the equivalent impedance of the circuit whose ends are node i and node
j; Uij is the voltage between i and j and Ii is the current injected at node i and extracted
at node j (Ii = −Ij). As shown in Fig. 1 the equivalent impedance is defined as
Zij =
Uij
Ii
.
Furthermore, let Ii = 1, Ij = −1 and Ih = 0 ∀ h 6= i, j (meaning that a unit current is
injected at node i and extracted at j, while no current is extracted nor injected in other
nodes), then the computation of equivalent impedance is sketched in Fig. 1 and amounts to
Zij =
Uij
Ii
= Uij ⇒ Zij = Ui − Uj = (zii − zij)− (zij − zjj) = zii − 2zij + zjj , (6)
where zij is the i-th, j-th element of the impedance matrix, see the Appendix.
In the following electrical networks are analyzed using a DC model. For a discussion of
the reasons to choose a DC rather than an AC model, see the Appendix. In a DC power flow
model the distance dkij defined in Eq. (4) is equal to the variation of voltage angle between
nodes i and j, when 1 unit of active power is injected at i and collected at j. Since in the DC
power flow model the variation of voltage angle is considered as the equivalent DC voltage
and the active power is considered as the current, dkij for any involved path between i and j
is equal to the equivalent impedance of the circuit whose ends are i and j.
dkij = Zij ∀ k . (7)
Again, the expression of the distance between i and j given in Eq. (7) is not related to a
specific path, since it takes into account all the existing paths between i and j.
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FIG. 1: The computation scheme of equivalent impedance
Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (5) and keeping in mind that:
∑
k∈Hij
pkij = 1 ,
we obtain:
A =
1
NGND
∑
i∈G
∑
j∈D
Cij
Zij
. (8)
In analogy with the expression of the vulnerability given by Eq. (2), we define the vul-
nerability of line l as the net-ability drop caused by an outage (cut) of the line l:
VA(l) =
A− Al
A
(9)
IV. CASE STUDY
In this section we use the two definitions, given by Eqs. (2) and (9), to estimate the line
vulnerability of IEEE sample networks [51], made of 30 and 57 nodes. For each case, the
results obtained from efficiency and net-ability are compared with the overload rate, defined
following [52]. The overload in an electrical network is given by:
P =
∑
l∈L
|Pl|
P liml
, (10)
where Pl is the power flow through line l calculated by the DC load flow model (see the
Appendix), P liml is the flow limit of line l and the sum is taken over the set L of lines in the
network. We are interested in the sensitivity of P to line outages, therefore we call P (l) the
real power performance parameter of the network upon cutting line l. The overload rate is
then defined as:
W (l) =
P (l)− P
P
. (11)
8Case30 Pg Pg′ Case57 Pg Pg′
node 1 260.2 260.2 node 1 128.9 128.9
node 2 40 40 node 2 0 120
node 5 0 210 node 3 40 40
node 8 0 130 node 6 0 55
node 11 0 95 node 8 450 450
node 13 0 78 node 9 0 230
node 12 310 310
TABLE I: Real power conversion for the IEEE 30- and 57-nodes generators.
In figure 2, we have plotted the vulnerability VE (Eq. (2)), the vulnerability VA (Eq. (9))
and the overload rate (Eq. (11)) versus line removal for the IEEE test cases with 30 and
57 nodes respectively. A few comments on the overload rate are appropriate. As we have
shown, the overload rate is obtained by computing the power flow through each line of the
network in the DC approximation. For a given network, the value of the DC power flow
through each line is a non linear function of power injections (withdraws) at the generators
(loads). On the other hand, those values are not taken into account in the definitions of
efficiency and net-ability. Furthermore, in the IEEE test cases several generators produce
pure reactive power, namely they are assigned a real power output equal to zero. On one side
this means that these are not treated as generators in a DC flow model; on the other side
these nodes are considered as generators both by the efficiency and net-ability algorithms.
In order to overcome this limit, we have chosen to assign arbitrary values of active power
output to the generators which are purely reactive. In table I, we show explicitly these
changes: in particular we keep the IEEE numeration for the generators, Pg indicates the
IEEE real power output, while Pg′ indicates the real power output assigned here.
In conclusion, one can not expect a complete match between the results based on efficiency
or net-ability and those based on the DC power flow. However, it appears from figure
2 that in each of the sample cases under consideration the methods based on net-ability
and overload rate computation can evidence a few highly critical lines; on the contrary,
the plots obtained by the efficiency method are much smoother, without any sharp peak.
9Efficiency Net-Ability Overload
σ2 (30) 1.94 30.55 24.05
σ2 (57) 0.81 10.42 17.17
ρ (30) 0.08 0.43 1
ρ (57) 0.13 0.76 1
TABLE II: Variances σ2 of the curves of efficiency drop, net-ability drop and overload rate; cor-
relation coefficients ρ between efficiency/overload, net-ability/overload and overload/overload for
the IEEE 30-nodes and 57-nodes test cases plotted in Figure 2.
In order to quantify this difference, in table II we report the variances σ2 of the curves
plotted in the figure 2. Moreover, the correlation coefficients ρ between efficiency/overload,
net-ability/overload and overload/overload are reported. We observe that the variances
of the net-ability and overload curves are of the same order of magnitude, while those
obtained from the efficiency curve are about one order of magnitude smaller. Likewise
the correlation coefficients between net-ability/overload are significantly larger than those
between efficiency/overload.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a new network metric called net-ability is proposed, to evaluate the global
performance of electric power grids. Our aim was to estimate the impact of line outages
on the network performance in order to identify the most critical lines. In this respect we
have analyzed sample networks taken from the IEEE database [51]. For each system, three
different methods to evaluate the impact of line outages have been used: 1- the method based
on efficiency; 2- the new method based on net-ability; 3- the computation of line overloads by
DC power flow. Since the latter is the approach which takes into account the specific details
of power grids, it can be considered as the reference method. From this point of view, the
net-ability is capable of identifying some of the most critical lines. However, we stress how
the line overloads depend non linearly upon the values of power injections/withdraws at the
nodes. In real power networks such values are not constant, as the demand and production
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of electrical power vary considerably in time, for instance depending on the period of the
year and the hours of the day. On the other hand, both the efficiency and the net-ability
approach are based essentially on the topological features of the network and do not take
into account the actual values of power injections and withdraws.
In order to check the validity of these topological approaches for real networks, one should
compare their results with those obtained from overload computation, after performing a
sort of time integration of the latter. At present such kind of time integration looks difficult
to be implemented in an algorithm. However, it is actually performed by direct observation
by those companies which are in charge of the management and control of power grids in each
country and therefore have monitored each country network for years. We have investigated
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FIG. 2: Vulnerabilities and overload rate vs line removal for a 30 nodes, 41 lines IEEE test case
(above); for a 57 nodes, 78 lines IEEE test case (below).
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the data of the Italian power grid from Terna - Rete Elettrica Nazionale S.p.A. [53] in terms
of net-ability, in order to find the most critical lines in the network. Although explicit
results are confidential for obvious security reasons, we can say that a good match has
been found between the results obtained by the net-ability algorithm and the experimental
measurements collected by Terna.
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APPENDIX A: LINEARIZED POWER SYSTEMS MODELS
Here we provide a brief review of the main issues and tools of power system analysis used
in this work; for a comprehensive treatment we refer to [54].
A power transmission system can be schematically represented as a grid whose lines are
electrical transmission lines, while nodes are the points where electrical power can be in-
jected, withdrawn or redistributed. Accordingly, in a power grid one can distinguish three
types of nodes: generation nodes (generators or power plants), load nodes (consumers),
transmission nodes. Each line in a power network has its own maximum power flow capa-
bility, which is the maximum amount of power flow that the line can sustain.
Power transmission systems operate in a sinusoidal steady state. For a circuit made of
N + 1 buses operating in AC regime the nodal equations are written as


I1
I2
...
IN


=


Y11 Y12 · · · Y1N
Y21 Y22 · · · Y2N
...
...
. . .
...
YN1 YN2 · · · YNN




U1
U2
...
UN


(A1)
where
Ii = Iie
ıθ Yij = yije
ıγij Ui = Uie
ıδi
are complex quantities. In matrix notation Eq. A1 writes
I = Y U (A2)
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where I is the vector of current sources, Y is the line admittance matrix and U is the vector
of node voltages. Node 0 is selected as the reference node (ground), and node voltages Ui
are defined with respect to node 0. The elements of the matrix Y are formed as follows:
• diagonal elements Yii: sum of the admittances of the lines connected to node i;
• off-diagonal elements Yij: minus the sum of the admittances of the lines connecting
nodes i and j.
The complex power Si flowing through a node i is defined as the product of the voltage
Ui and the complex conjugate of the current Ii:
Si = UiIi
∗
= Ui
N∑
k=1
Uk
∗
Yki
∗
= Pi + ıQi ; (A3)
P and Q are called real and reactive power respectively, see [54] for throughout explanation.
Since the quantities involved in a AC system show a sinusoidal behaviour, solving a full
AC power flow model means that one has to solve a system of non linear equations, which
is widely known to be a formidable task. The most common method to reduce the power
flow problem to a set of linear equations is called the DC power flow.
The DC power flow approach is based on a number of approximations:
• reactive power balance equations are ignored;
• line losses are ignored, that is the resistance of each line is set to zero, so only the
reactance (imaginary part of the impedance) is considered: yii = yij = yjj = 1/xij (xij
is the reactance of the line connecting i to j), γii = γjj = −
pi
2
and γij =
pi
2
;
• all voltage magnitudes are identically set to one per unit, Ui = 1 ∀ i;
• all voltage angles are assumed to be small, δi → 0 ∀ i.
Under these approximations, the power flow through line l, connecting nodes i and j, is
given by
fl = Pi = −Pj =
UiUj sin(δi − δj)
xij
=
δi − δj
xij
. (A4)
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In a general circuit made of N nodes and L lines, where P is the vector of real power
injections, δ the vector of phase angles and f the vector of power flows we have
Pi =
∑
l:i→∀j
fl =
N∑
j=1
δi − δj
xij
(A5)
P = Bδ (A6)
Where B is the N ×N admittance matrix:
Bij = −
1
xij
for i 6= j
Bii =
∑
j 6=i
1
xij
In terms of the vector of power flows we have
f = Hδ (A7)
where H is the L×N transmission matrix:
Hli = −Hlj =
1
xij
Hlk = 0 ∀ k 6= i, j
The admittance matrix B is singular since the sum of the elements of each row is equal
to zero:
∑N
i=1Bij = 0 ∀ j. This means that the total injection power is equal to zero:
N∑
i=1
Pi = 0 ⇒ Pi = −
∑
j 6=i
Pj
To avoid this redundancy a slack node, for instance node N , is chosen and set δN = 0. Thus
one can eliminate the corresponding terms in power vectors and matrices without losing
information. In this spirit, B′ and H ′ are sub-matrices, obtained respectively from B and H
by deleting the row and column (only the column in case of H) corresponding to the slack
node N , while δ
′
and P
′
are respectively the vector of phase angles and vector of node power
injections without the slack node N .
The matrix B′ can be inverted and thus one can rewrite Eqs. (A6) and (A7) in terms of
the modified vectors and matrices as
δ
′
= B′−1P
′
(A8)
f = H ′B′−1P
′
= AP
′
(A9)
14
The Power Transmission Distribution Factors (PTDF) of the circuit are the entries of the
matrix A in Eq. (A9).
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